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Transitional justice is usually addressed through institutional processes such as lustration, 
restitution, prosecution and “truth commissions”, around which a comprehensive academic 
literature has developed. However, this chapter explores a relatively neglected symbolic 
dimension of transitional justice
1
, namely practices of memorialization and commemoration 
that are represented, played out and contested in urban space. There is widespread 
acknowledgment within the transitional justice literature that memorialization – in the form of 
monuments, statues and museums – has a key role to play in healing the wounds of the 
communist past. Such memorials “represent a critical terrain where the past is confronted and 
conflict can be addressed”2. Memorialization is a means of giving recognition to those who 
suffered hardship, repression, exile or death under Communist regimes. The practice makes a 
visible statement about what (and who) a political order considers worthy of remembrance 
and is a means of reaching large numbers of people over an extended period of time.  
 
In this chapter we focus on the various ways in which transitional justice for the victims of 
Communist regimes is expressed in the highly complex entanglement of urban cultural 
landscapes, public memory, and commemorative sites and practices. We contend that 
attempts to shape public memory through practices of commemoration and memorialization 
are important (if neglected) aspects of transitional justice, that have much to tell us about how 
post-communist societies choose to remember – and forget – the period of Communist Party 
rule. Following a review of the relationships between public memory and urban space we 
begin by examining efforts to erase the commemorative landscape produced by communist 
regimes. We then look at the variety of initiatives (by diverse elites and publics) to 
commemorate the victims of Communist regimes, with particular reference to monuments, 
memorials and museums. We also highlight the importance of both domestic and international 
tourism to these sites of memory as central to the way in which they ‘work’.  
 
 
PUBLIC MEMORY, COMMEMORATION AND URBAN SPACE 
 
Public memory can be defined as “a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public 
or society understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future”3. It is a society’s 
collective understanding of the past, but also the ways that this past is represented in the 
present.
4
 Since memory is integral to the formation of identities
5
, collective (or public) 
memory has long been important in the construction of collective identities. In particular, 
nation-states construct and promote a particular understanding of the past within nation-
building projects that are intended to foster social cohesion and a sense of allegiance to a 
particular ‘imagined community’.6 The formation of such a collective memory involves 
choices about what a society wishes to remember. Nevertheless, while states may play a 
leading role in the construction of collective memory they do not enjoy a monopoly over this 
process. Instead various elites and publics both within and without the state (each of which 
may be fractured by competing and contesting agendas) participate in the process
7
 so that the 
formation of public memory is a fluid process of negotiation.
8
 Public memory “emerges from 
the intersection of official and vernacular cultural expressions”9 and, for this reason, it is best 




An important aspect of public memory which is central to our argument in this chapter is that 
it is a process which is worked out in the public arena. This is achieved through various 
practices of remembrance and commemoration intended to reify public memory by turning it 
into visual spectacle. In particular, human geographers argue that urban space – or landscape 
– is essential to the ‘working’ of public memory.11 All political orders seek to create an 
‘official public landscape’12 which is intended as a rhetorical statement of specific political 
values. Remembrance and commemoration are central aspects of such landscapes: indeed, 
Edensor
13
 has coined the term ‘memoryscape’ for those parts of the urban landscape that are 
given over to collective remembrance. The urban environment can be the setting for a range 
of temporary (if cyclical) commemorative practices including ceremonies, parades, festivals 
and rituals. However, most forms of commemoration are permanent and include a range of 
statues, monuments, memorials and other public buildings, along with commemorative names 
attached to streets, buildings and other urban landmarks. Such commemorative practices 
concretise ‘official’ conceptions of public memory, rendering it seemingly immutable in the 
public arena. They can, however, also be sites for the expression of opposition to, and 
contestation of, this official public memory.  
 
Since public memory is produced in a particular political context it is vulnerable to any 
process of political change. In particular, all shifts of political power “generate a 
reconfiguration of the “known past””.14 This issue is of particular relevance in post-
communist societies which have sought to build political identities based on an emphatic 
rejection of communism (a strategy which generally enjoyed widespread popular support). In 
this context such societies faced the need for a new, appropriate and ‘usable’ past to replace 
now discredited communist-era constructions of the collective past. The most readily 
available model was that of the period before communist rule.
15
 Thus, throughout East-
Central Europe there has been a focus on the pre-communist past as the model for a post-
communist future. As Katherine Verdery
16
 has argued, this is about effectively excising the 
communist period from the historical time line (and, initially, denying that it ever happened) 
and returning to the period before the Second World War; it suggests that history is able to 
resume the authentic trajectory it would have taken, had it not been for the ‘aberration’ of four 
decades of communist party rule. Clearly in post-communist contexts, the past is something 
that is fluid and flexible, with different state and non-state groups competing to establish a 
new historical narrative.  
 
Similarly, public memory is also in a state of reformation.
17
 Within the political 
transformation from totalitarianism to democracy, post-communist societies face new choices 
about what (and who) they want to remember, and how (and where) this remembrance will be 
enacted. At the same time as seeking to forget communism, the new societies will want to 
remember the repression and violence of the former regime, and to honour the victims of state 
persecution. There may also be a desire to remember the events that brought about the 
collapse of Communist regimes (even if, in some cases, these events did not in themselves 
bring about a clear break with those regimes). Moreover, given that the urban landscape is 
central to the expression of public memory these debates will, in some way, be worked out in 
urban space. In particular there will be a significant remaking of the commemorative 
landscape. People and events that were honoured by the previous regime will be de-
commemorated and their memorials removed from the public arena. New acts of 
commemoration will subsequently follow in a way that accords with the political values and 
public memory of the new regime.  
 
In this way, practices of commemoration and memorialization within the urban landscape can 
be important (if often overlooked) elements of transitional justice projects in post-communist 
states. Indeed, memorialization and collective remembrance are fundamental processes in 
societies recovering from traumatic pasts.
18
 Barsalou and Baxter
19
 argue that memorialization 
has a number of roles in such projects: it offers symbolic reparations to the victims of 
violence; it can promote reconciliation; it can encourage engagement with education 
programmes about the recent past; and it creates specific sites that can be the focus both of 
individual mourning and official ceremonies of remembrance. Of particular relevance to our 
argument in this chapter, is that memorialization makes a highly visible statement in the 
public arena about a post-communist society’s commitment to a new set of political values. In 
fact, of all the forms of transitional justice, memorialisation is probably the most visible and 
has the potential to have an impact on the everyday lives of the greatest number of people. 
Yet, to date, there has been only sporadic attention in the transitional justice literature to the 
role of memorialization projects within the urban landscape. This reflects a broader context in 
which political scientists have paid relatively little attention to the role of monuments and 
memorials as political symbols.
20
 In the following sections we explore changing practices of 
memorialization in post-communist East-Central Europe, focussing firstly on the removal of 
the commemorative landscapes created by communist regimes, and secondly, on the efforts to 




 ERASING THE COMMEMORATIVE LANDSCAPE OF COMMUNISM  
 
When Communist Party regimes came to power in the late 1940s they immediately set about 
remaking public memory. This was principally achieved through a comprehensive rewriting 
of history and total control over the education system. It also included a comprehensive 
remaking of the urban landscape to decommemorate the historical narrative associated with 
the now-discredited former regime. Since communist regimes attached especial importance to 
the transformative power of public space for creating a new socialist consciousness
21
 the 
public arena effectively became an instrument of state propaganda. An entirely new 
commemorative landscape was produced which was saturated with a variety of symbols 
(including statues, memorials, monuments, plaques, murals, banners, and slogans)
22
 that were 
intended to shape the ways that people thought about their individual and collective pasts.  
 
As communist regimes in East-Central Europe started to collapse in 1989 their official 
commemorative landscapes swiftly became the targets of protest, resulting in the familiar 
process of ‘landscape cleansing’.23 This activity was initiated by the populace during the 
euphoria that accompanied the collapse of Communist Party rule and continued by the new 
post-communist administrations. This process satisfied the demand to see evidence of 
political change.
24
 Czepczyński25 identifies a number of strategies for landscape cleansing: 
removal, renaming, rededication and reuse. The most visible strategy is removal, where 
monuments placed by the communist states were directly expunged from the urban arena. By 
far the most iconic images of the collapse of communist regimes were the removal of statues 
of Soviet figures such as Lenin. These events required considerable organisation and 
resources, and so were usually orchestrated by the state.
26
 They provided a dramatic and 
highly visible proclamation that political order was changing. However, in most cases the 
eradication of communist statuary was both less spectacular and less immediate, with most 
removals taking place quietly during the early years of the post-communist period.
27
 Only in a 
few instances were communist monuments destroyed in situ: the dynamiting of Georgi 
Dimitrov’s mausoleum in Sofia in 1999 was the best example.28  
 
However, in most instances communist monuments and statues were not destroyed but 
instead they were simply moved to new locations. For example, in Hungary, the Budapest city 
authority made the decision in 1991 to remove over 40 communist-era statues and monuments 
and relocate them in an open-air museum on the edge of the city - named ‘Statuepark’ - which 
opened to visitors in 1993. This strategy allowed the monuments to be retained both as 
historical artefacts and as reminders of a traumatic past but in a way that emasculated their 
symbolic power within the urban landscape.
29
 In other cases the removal of communist 
statues was vigorously contested. The best example is the ‘Bronze Soldier’ in Tallinn, Estonia 
which commemorated Soviet soldiers who had fallen in the liberation of the city at the end of 
the Second World War. As an obviously Soviet symbol its presence in the city centre was 
unwelcome for the post-communist Estonian government which, in 2007, made the decision 
to move the memorial to a military cemetery on the edge of the city. This provoked violent 
protest by Estonia’s Russian minority who interpreted the removal of the statue as an attack 




A less dramatic strategy was the renaming of streets, buildings and other urban landmarks to 
de-commemorate events and personalities from communist-era historiography. This practice 
has been termed “toponymic cleansing”.31 Such renaming is “an act of political propaganda 
with immense proclamative value and public resonance”32:  it makes an immediate statement 
that public memory is changing, and is relatively quick and simple to implement. Renaming 
was intended to decommemorate the communist past and also to ‘place’ a new narrative of 
national history and memory into public space. However, renaming urban streets and 
buildings was relatively limited in scale and was most prominent in the central areas of towns 
and cities. Since many toponyms allocated during the communist era had no ideological 
connotations they did not need to be renamed. So, for example, in Bucharest only 6.6% of the 
city’s streets were renamed after 198933 and in other post-communist cities the proportion was 
lower.  
 
Strategies of rededication and reuse were applied mostly to museums. Communist regimes 
attached considerable importance to museums
34
 as a means of socialist propaganda so that 
hundreds of new museums were established in communist East-Central Europe. Most 
countries had at least one museum dedicated entirely to the history and activities of that 
country’s Communist Party. These were complemented by a network of regional and local 
museums, all of which interpreted local history through the lens of Marxism-Leninism. With 
the fall of Communism, the museums dedicated to Party history were swiftly closed. Some 
reopened as different museums (for example, in Bucharest the former ‘History Museum of the 
Communist Party, of the Revolutionary and Democratic Movement of Romania’ reopened in 
1990 as the ‘Museum of the Romanian Peasant’35) while in other cases, the buildings were put 
to entirely new uses. As the formerly communist states were gripped by ‘collective amnesia’ 
about the recent past almost all museums simply closed any galleries which dealt with the 
communist period: the displays remained in place but in locked rooms with no public access. 
Bădica36 describes this as the “black hole paradigm” where the historical narrative presented 
in museums simply ended in 1945. 
 
Overall, then, the efforts to neutralise the commemorative symbols of communism (and the 
public memory that they represented) was a crude first step in achieving redress for the abuses 
and hardship of the communist era. However, the process of landscape cleansing was always 
partial. It was applied most thoroughly to the central parts of cities (particularly capitals) and 
to a lesser extent (and sometimes hardly at all) in more peripheral districts. Its target was the 
most visible and iconic symbols of the communist regime, while smaller or more 
inconspicuous symbols were often ignored or overlooked. Removing or reconfiguring the 
commemorative landscape of communism effectively cleared space in the urban arena for an 
entirely new set of commemorative practices that were specifically intended to remember the 
victims and abuses of communism. These are discussed in the following section 
 
 
COMMEMORATING THE VICTIMS OF, AND RESISTANCE TO, COMMUNIST 
REGIMES  
 
Within strategies to redefine public memory there have been two broad strands to the 
remaking of commemorative landscapes. First, in the effort to (re)establish a ‘normal’ past 
post-socialist societies have attempted to correct the distortions of communist-era 
historiography. In addition to de-commemorating key figures from the communist version of 
history there has been a focus on reinstating and re-commemorating those people (such as 
politicians and monarchs) who were excised from public memory by communist historians. 
This, in turn, resulted in new practices of memorialisation in the public arena and, once the 
official public landscape had been de-communised, it could be repopulated with new 
monuments, statues, memorials and toponyms. The most straightforward way to do this was 
by returning streets to their pre-communist commemorative names. For example, in central 
Bucharest 14 streets commemorating pre-communist politicians that had been renamed by the 
communist regime returned to their former names, as did 4 streets which commemorated the 
Romanian monarchy.
37
 Over time, new statues and monuments were commissioned to 
commemorate those figures who had been disavowed during the communist period. For 
example a statue of Tomáš Masaryk was erected in Prague in 2000, and a statue of King Carol 
I (based on an earlier statue destroyed by the communist regime) was unveiled in Bucharest in 
2010. Such practices represent a symbolic correction of a form of historical injustice, 
although they are not usually considered as part of transitional justice projects. 
 
Second, post-communist societies faced the challenge of how to remember the communist 
period and how to commemorate its victims. Although in many countries there was an initial 
desire to forget the communist past completely, at a later stage there was general agreement 
that the abuses of communism should be memorialised. The construction of memorials, 
monuments and museums is a means of acknowledging the abuses of the communist era; 
giving recognition to the victims; and promoting a sense of social cohesion and belonging that 
is rooted in a traumatic recent past.
38
 A range of actors, both within and outside the state 
participate in such memorialisation. In some countries governments have been very active in 
promoting remembrance of the abuses of Communist Party regimes
39
 as a form of transitional 
justice that compliments other legal and institutional measures. States can also use practices 
of memorialization to affirm and legitimate (to both domestic and international audiences) 
their commitment to political values that are the antithesis of communism.
40
 Civil society 
groups and non-governmental organisations have also been active in memorialising the 
communist past, particularly in those countries where former communist officials have 
remained in power and have been more unwilling to condemn the communist era.
41
 In 
addition, ordinary individuals can also be involved in the process of remembrance through 
creating and placing their own, informal memorials in the urban landscape. The 
commemorative landscape is therefore characterised by a bricolage of memorial forms, 
dedicated to different subjects and groups, in a wide range of locations, and with a wide range 
of sponsors. Here, we focus on two broad categories of memorialization: first, monuments 
and memorials, and second, museums (with associated practices of tourism) 
 
 
Monuments and Memorials 
 
For states engaged in enacting transitional justice the erection of monuments and statues in 
the public arena has provided one means of recognition of the injustices of the Communist 
past. As a result there are many examples of such commemoration, although it is by no means 
a thorough, consistent and comprehensive practice. Indeed, what is perhaps surprising is the 
relative paucity of such memorials combined with the controversy that they sometimes 
generate. Representing the condemnation of the Communist past and its injustices through 
memorialisation is not, therefore a straightforward process.  
 
The memorials that have been erected differ widely in terms of their form, the subject that 
they commemorate, and the sponsoring organisation behind them. Some memorials 
commemorate the actions and death of a specific individual. While they focus on the sacrifice 
of the individual they implicitly draw attention to the broader injustices of the regimes 
responsible. Examples here include the monument in Prague to Jan Palach, the student who 
committed suicide in January 1969 in protest against the Soviet repression of the “Prague 
Spring”. A bronze cross is now embedded into the spot outside the national museum where he 
died. Palach is also commemorated through the naming of a square in Prague, several other 
memorials throughout Europe, and even the naming (by a Czech astronomer) of an asteroid 
after him. Other memorials are dedicated to groups of individuals who died in specific sites. 
A key example is the memorials to those killed trying to cross the Berlin Wall. The White 
Crosses memorial features seven crosses inscribed with the names of thirteen people who 
were killed in this way.  First erected by a private group in 1971 in West Berlin it has always 
been associated with key symbolic parts of the urban landscape, initially being located near 
the Reichstag and now beside the offices of the new unified German government. Deaths 
associated with the Berlin Wall are also commemorated generically at the Gedenkstätte 
Berliner Mauer (Berlin Wall Memorial).  
 
Some memorials acknowledge deaths associated with specific events or more broadly with 
specific aspects of totalitarian oppression. These include a series of memorials to victims of 
the KGB in Tartu, Vilnius, Riga and Potsdam, and memorials to the Katyn massacre. In 
Moldova a stone cross at Răzeni commemorates the ten victims of the Soviet-led massacre of 
1941, while in Chişinău there is a Memorial to the Victims of Stalinist Repression. A plaque in 
a square just off Rustavelli Avenue in Tbilisi, Georgia, commemorates those killed by Soviet 
forces during protests in 1956 (ironically protests partly motivated by the denouncement of 
Stalin). In Gdańsk (Poland) the Monument to the Fallen Shipyard Workers of 1970 memorial 
was unusually erected during the Communist period itself (in 1980). Other memorial sites are 
aimed more broadly at remembering the national experience of Communism. For example, 
the Memorial to the Victims of Communism in Prague, erected in 2002, seeks to shape the 
collective memory of those who died under Czechoslovak Communism. Supported by the 
local authority and the Confederation of Political Prisoners (KPV) it seeks to commemorate 
those who suffered politically and personally, detailing the numbers shot or who died in 
prison, were arrested or exiled. A bronze plaque reads: "The memorial to the victims of 
communism is dedicated to all victims not only those who were jailed or executed but also 
those whose lives were ruined by totalitarian despotism". This memorial has attracted some 
criticism for its gendered nature (no female figures are represented) and for its aesthetic 
qualities, raising the issue of the public reception of such forms of commemoration. 
 
Finally, some monuments commemorate collective suffering under Communism and are 
intended to denounce the period as a whole. Such monuments sometimes prove to be 
controversial. The Gloria Victis Memorial is located on the outskirts of Budapest, Hungary, 
and seeks to honor “one hundred million casualties of universal communism”. This memorial 
is the first to attempt to commemorate all the victims of Communist repression and was 
erected in 2006 (the fiftieth anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution). This memorial is 
more complex than those commemorating individuals or specific groups, and incorporates 
local, national and international representations of the victimization of citizens. It includes a 
world map of victims; memorials to the Ukrainian minority in Hungary; tablets 
commemorating the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Jewish and Roma victims of Communism, and 
the Katyn massacre; and the text of Resolution 1481 (2006) of the Council of Europe entitled 
The Necessity of International Condemnation of the Crimes Committed by Totalitarian 
Communist Regimes. Clearly such a memorialization process becomes significantly more 
complex when trying to represent the suffering of all the victims of Communism, compared to 
the memory of an individual.  
 
In addition to memorialising the abuses of communist regimes, various monuments 
commemorate the events that brought about the overthrow of Communist Party regimes in 
1989. Pearce
42
 suggests that some post-socialist states have encountered problems in trying to 
establish official commemorative practices around the events of 1989 (such as which key 
dates or events should form the basis of state-sponsored commemoration). In some cases, the 
official narrative of events is strongly contested. For example, in 2005 Romania erected a 
Memorial of Rebirth in Bucharest which was intended to symbolise the struggle against the 
Ceausescu regime and to commemorate those who died in the violent ‘revolution’ of 1989. It 
is the official site of remembrance and the setting for state-led performances and rituals which 
attempt to shape post-communist visions of Romania’s past and future. However, the 
monument itself has been roundly criticised on aesthetic and architectural grounds. Moreover 
the site holds little resonance for many Romanians who interpret the events of December 
1989 more as a coup d’état than a genuine popular revolution. Consequently the Memorial of 
Rebirth has failed to become the focus of popular allegiance and its role in shaping public 
memory among Romanians is unclear.  
 
This overview of the use of monuments, plaques, statues and memorials is not intended to be 
exhaustive but instead seeks to demonstrate the range of types of memorialisation practices 
which attempt to place transitional justice into the public arena. There is not space here to 
discuss in detail the design and symbolism of each of these sites (although this is an important 
subject for further research). Moreover, we know relatively little about the public reaction to – 
and reception of - such commemorative landscapes. However the examples above give hints 
of how even what might appear to be a straightforward process – condemning Communism 
and commemorating its victims in public space – in fact can be contested and subject to 
debate. The example of the Memorial of Rebirth illustrates that while political elites may seek 
to shape transitional justice projects and the remembrance of the victims of communism, they 
may not always succeed.  Instead, projects to shape commemoration and public memory can 
sometimes be contested and challenged by the populace.  The public reception of sites and 
practices of memorialisation remains a neglected aspect of transitional justice. 
Museums and Tourism 
 
To fully appreciate the role of museums within transitional justice projects it is important to 
recognise that museums are not simply collections of objects put on public display for the 
education and entertainment of visitors. Instead, museums have always had a broader 
ideological purpose. They are a form of public culture through which political elites tell a 
society about itself and where it has come from. In particular, those museums that are 
sponsored by the state have an important role in ‘telling the national story’. They are 
institutions that are intended to be visited by the citizenry and which have a clearly articulated 
educational mission. They aim to communicate a particular understanding of the past and in 
this context they play a significant role in the making (and remaking) of public memory. More 
broadly, as a means of ‘staging’ the nation43 museums contribute to the formation of 
collective identities and their importance within nation-building projects is widely 
acknowledged.
44
 As the earlier discussion noted, communist regimes were fully aware of the 
educative and propagandist role of museums in communicating their political agenda (and the 
associated narrative of national history) to a broad public. 
 
In a post-communist context, museums are important ‘vehicles of memory’45 within projects 
to memorialize the communist past. In particular, museums can tell the story of the 
oppression, human rights abuses and suffering inflicted by Communist Party regimes. This, 
obviously, is a story that has not been formally told before (since it was not something that 
communist regimes were likely to draw attention to). Moreover, museums can interpret the 
communist period from the perspective of the people who lived through it. This is a bottom-
up narrative of history that focuses on everyday lives of ordinary people, rather than the 
macro-political agenda of the communist state and its leading political party. Memorial 
museums also interpret communist rule for future generations who did not experience it 
themselves in order to help them understand the experiences that shaped their parents’ and 
grandparents’ generation. Museums can also be locations for ceremonies and rituals intended 
to commemorate the victims of communist rule. Overall, memorial museums that are 
established as part of transitional justice projects are institutions intended to encourage 
remembrance, reflection and civic engagement.
46
 But they are not just about the communist 
past: museums can also be used to make an unambiguous statement about a state’s post-
communist political identity and aspirations. In this context they are sites for “performances 
of democracy, not static representations of national identity”.47 The use of museums in this 
way is, of course, as equally ideological as anything seen during the communist period, but 
now for entirely different ends.  
 
What is important – but frequently overlooked – is the role of tourism in this process. 
Memorial museums are intended to be visited (and as such they function as visitor 
‘attractions’ even if their subject matter is far from attractive). Some of the visitors to 
memorial museums will be children and young people, studying the communist period as part 
of their educational curriculum. However, most people will be visiting during their leisure 
time. Furthermore many of these people will be tourists (conventionally defined as people 
staying away from their home area for at least 24 hours) who can be both domestic (citizens 
of a country travelling within that country) and international (visitors from other countries). 
Although political scientists may be inclined to dismiss tourism as rather trivial and with little 
to offer in understanding politics, there is growing interest within the discipline of tourism 
studies in the ways that tourism can contribute to broader political projects and objectives.
48
 
For example, visiting historic buildings and monuments is a means of ‘connecting’ with the 
broader community of the nation
49
 and as such tourism can be identified as one form of banal 
nationalism.
50
 Tourism can also be used to project political identities to an external audience. 
For example, a number of recent studies have explored how the Central and Eastern European 
countries have used their state-sponsored tourism promotional materials to project a distinctly 




In the context of transitional justice projects, tourists can be encouraged to visit particular 
places (such as museums) in order to purposefully communicate to them a message about the 
communist past and the post-communist future. Moreover, many of these people will be 
heritage tourists who are interested in, and receptive to, learning during their leisure time
52
. 
For domestic tourists, the visit to a memorial museum performs the same role as other 
monuments and memorials: it is a reminder of the traumas of the recent past, a recognition of 
the victims of that past, and a warning to future generations. At the same time it is an 
affirmation of the rejection of communism and a commitment to broader ‘European’ values. 
However, international tourists are an equally important (and sometimes numerically 
dominant) audience (and for this reason most memorial museums make extensive use of 
displays and interpretation in the English language, and often in a range of other European 
languages). Most international visitors will have no direct experience of living under 
Communist Party rule (and often little background knowledge or understanding of 
communism). Therefore museums are a way of telling such visitors the story of ‘what we 
lived through’ and ‘the events that shaped us’. It is also a way of affirming and legitimating a 
commitment to the same political and economic agendas that have underpinned European 
integration since the Second World War.  
 
There are an increasing number of museums in the Central and Eastern European countries 
that explicitly address the communist era. Most countries have a national museum (usually a 
monumental building located in the capital city) and these increasingly include a gallery 
dedicated to the recent past (although such galleries are usually fairly neutral historical 
accounts of the communist period). There are also museums specifically dedicated to 
interpreting the nature of life in a communist state. Some (such as the Museum of 
Communism in Prague or the DDR Museum in Berlin) have been set up by private 
entrepreneurs in order to cater for the interest of Western visitors, rather than being intended 
to contribute to transitional justice projects. However, there are many other museums have 
been established with the direct or indirect support of the state authorities, specifically to 
remember the abuses and victims of communist rule. Perhaps the best examples are Estonia’s 
Museum of Occupations (which opened in 2003 in a purpose-built structure), the Museum of 
the Occupation of Latvia (opened 1993) and Lithuania’s Museum of Genocide Victims 
(established 1992 in the former headquarters of the Soviet Security service). Each is located 
in the respective capital city. All are run by foundations although with state support. The 
motto of Latvia’s museum – “Remembering, Commemorating, Reminding”53 clearly 
indicates the place of the museum within the broader project of achieving transitional justice. 
The displays of these museums focus on the nature of totalitarian rule; the impact on politics, 
economy and domestic life; the nature of domestic repression and human rights abuses; the 
activities of resistance groups; and the struggle for, and achievement of, independence in the 
early 1990s. All receive large numbers of foreign tourists and are also included in the 
itineraries of visiting politicians and dignitaries.  
 
Other museums have been opened in buildings that were formerly prisons or were associated 
in other ways with the repressive apparatus of communist regimes. The conversion of such 
buildings into memorial museums is a form of symbolic ‘re-inscription’ that is intended to 
give them a new use for memorialising the practices that they formerly hosted. The best 
example is the Memorial to the Victims of Communism and to the Resistance in Sighet, 
Romania. This opened in 1998 in a building that had formerly been used as a prison and in 
which the majority of the pre-War Romanian political, military, social and academic elite had 
been imprisoned after the communist regime took power. The museum was developed by the 
Civic Academy Foundation (a non-governmental organisation) with the financial support of 
the Council of Europe. It hosts summer schools for young Romanians and publishes regular 
volumes of academic study about the communist era.
54
 Its significance as a site of public 
remembrance of the human rights abuses of the communist regime was recognised by the 
Romanian government which declared it a site of national interest in legislation of 1997.  
 
Another celebrated example is the former headquarters of the East German security service 
(the ‘Stasi’) in Berlin which opened as memorial and research centre in November 1990. As 
with other examples the site was managed by a non-governmental civil rights organisation, 
although with the support of the German government. The complex includes a museum with 
displays about the history and activities of the Stasi. Elsewhere in Berlin a former Stasi prison 
and interrogation centre also opened in 1994 as a museum and memorial (the Berlin-
Hohenschönhausen Memorial). It is run by a private foundation with government support and 
aims to encourage “a critical awareness of the methods and consequences of political 
persecution and suppression in the communist dictatorship”.55 Another example is Budapest’s 
House of Terror, again established by a public foundation with government backing. It is 
housed in the former headquarters of the Hungarian security police (ÁVH). This site is 
intended as a memorial to those Hungarians who were interrogated and tortured by the 
communist regime, an interpretation of life in communist Hungary, and an account of the 
struggle against the communist regime which ended in 1989.
56
 Significantly, it is also one of 
Budapest’s most popular tourist ‘attractions’. Elsewhere throughout post-communist Central 
and Eastern Europe there are numerous smaller prisons and interrogation centres that have 
been turned into museums, intended for both domestic and international visitors. 
 
Memorial museums are not without their critics. Although tourism is one of the principle 
means through which memorial sites are encountered there has long been a tendency to 
dismiss the practices of visitors to such places as trivial or insignificant. At best, tourists who 
visit places associated with trauma or tragedy are regarded as passive and unquestioning 
consumers who are incapable of fully appreciating the significance of the story presented to 
them and, at worst, as shallow thrill-seekers who are motivated by “a morbid and senseless 
curiosity”.57 However, recent research within the disciplines of tourism studies and 
anthropology has demonstrated that the behaviour of visitors to memorial places is far more 
purposeful and significant than is often appreciated, and that visitors can be engaged in highly 





 accept that visits to memorial museums may be associated with short term 
learning, understanding and changed attitudes but they question the longer-term impacts of 
such visits in bringing about deeper learning and a broader engagement with the issues of 
transitional justice. Overall, then, the ‘consumption’ of memorial museums by their visitors is 





Issues of memorialisation and the reformulation of public memory are often considered to be 
‘soft’ aspects of transitional justice and consequently they have not received as much 
academic attention as the ‘hard’ politics of truth commissions, lustration or restitution. 
However we argue that the issue of shaping public memory through commemorative practices 
and landscapes is an integral element of transitional justice projects which merits much fuller 
investigation. In concluding we highlight the importance of considering the cultural politics of 
transitional justice and we identify the lessons of accepting such a perspective.  
 
One overall lesson that emerges from considering public memory and its expression in the 
urban landscape is that transitional justice is not only played out in the spaces of courtrooms, 
legislatures and administrations. It is also worked out in public squares, memorial landscapes 
and museum. Indeed, we need to recognise the vast range of sites and spaces in which 
multiple practices of transitional justice ‘works’, through the initiatives of both elites and 
publics. In this context it is important to acknowledge that the past itself (and that ways that it 
is represented and memorialised) is fluid, multi-faceted and contested. While states are active 
players in the commemoration of the Communist past and in broader efforts to shape public 
memory they do not have a monopoly on the process. Instead, there are a range of other 
organisations and individuals involved in such commemoration, and consequently there is a 
diverse range of monuments, memorials and museums dedicated to the abuses and victims of 
Communist regimes. These are sites where individual and personal negotiations of transitional 
justice occur, alongside the official memorials, ceremonies and rituals sponsored by the state.  
 
Another key issue is the reach of these spaces of transitional justice. While processes such as 
lustration and even restitution have a symbolic dimension – showing that post-Communist 
states are acting to address past injustices – in societal terms their impact may be relatively 
limited. Not everyone in society was able to reclaim property or necessarily had a personal 
connection to key figures who were placed on trial. Hence, such practices arguably may have 
a limited impact on the everyday lives and practices of the majority of the population. 
However, monuments and commemorative landscapes have the potential to reach far more 
people in the course of their daily lives, and to address their wish for justice in a much more 
immediate and visible way. For most people, commemoration in the public arena is a form of 
public recognition that is important in coming to terms with past injustices. 
 
Furthermore, there are important temporal aspects to transitional justice that should be 
considered. The largest waves of restitution have been completed and there is probably 
considerably less scope for lustration (since those who could be tried either already have 
been, or are too old, or have died). Memorialisation in the public arena has a potentially much 
longer impact with the possibility of shaping public memory across generations. Twenty five 
years have now elapsed since 1989 and perhaps the forms of transitional justice projects must 
reflect this.  Shaping public memory through commemorative landscapes may well assume a 
greater importance as other processes decrease in frequency and effectiveness. If the purpose 
of such memorialisation is to help society to move on (yet without forgetting) then public 
commemorative landscapes perhaps hold the key. The construction of memorial landscapes 
may follow on from other, more contentious, processes of transitional justice (which, in turn, 
may shape the nature of commemorative practices). If such commemoration becomes a more 
long-term form of transitional justice which persists in public space for decades to come then 
it will require careful consideration and management. 
 
The final lesson from our chapter that follows on from the points above is that there is a need 
to explore public reception of landscapes and memorialisation. This is the area in which the 
literature is most weakly developed. As Barsalou and Baxter suggest, “the impact of all 
transitional justice processes – memorialisation among them – remains under-researched.”60 
They note the difficulty in determining what memorialisation actually contributes to 
reconciliation and justice. Thus we need to explore questions such as how do people relate to 
memorials and landscapes linked to transitional justice projects in their everyday lives? Do 
memorials work effectively as vehicles of transitional justice? Are they sites of remembrance 
or contestation, or do they simply become a backdrop to the everyday use of space in the city? 
Are they even regarded with apathy or simply ignored? Again, these issues have temporal and 
generational dimensions and will vary across multiple publics and elites. For example, some 
authors are sceptical about the long-term impact of museums on the public consciousness.
61
 
Furthermore, as Clark suggests, there is a danger that too much memorialisation may inhibit 
societies’ ability to move on.62 Moreover, different generations may have very different 
responses to the ways in which commemorative landscapes function as part of transitional 
justice, responses shaped by interactions between the generations mediated through the family 
and representations of history. An important issue for further research is the public reception 
of memorialisation aimed at righting the wrongs of the Communist era in order to help 
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